In its new project on Codification and Simplification, the FASB indicates its intent to evaluate the feasibility of issuing concepts-based standards rather than issuing detailed, rule-based standards with exceptions and alternatives.' Related to this project, members ofthe FASB board and staff asked the Finandal Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (hereafter, the Committee) to provide comments on concepts-based stemdards and to recast two standards as concepts-based.* This article simimarizes comments ofthe Committee on issues related to concepts-based vs. rules-based standards. Comments in this article reflect the views ofthe individuals on the Committee and not those ofthe American Accoimting Association.
INTRODUCTION
In its new project on Codification and Simplification, the FASB indicates its intent to evaluate the feasibility of issuing concepts-based standards rather than issuing detailed, rule-based standards with exceptions and alternatives.' Related to this project, members ofthe FASB board and staff asked the Finandal Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association (hereafter, the Committee) to provide comments on concepts-based stemdards and to recast two standards as concepts-based.* This article simimarizes comments ofthe Committee on issues related to concepts-based vs. rules-based standards. Comments in this article reflect the views ofthe individuals on the Committee and not those ofthe American Accoimting Association.
The Committee strongly supports the commitment by the FASB to evaluate the feasibility of concepts-based standsirds.^ We believe that tbe economic substance, not the form, of any given transaction should guide finandal reporting and standard setting, and that concepts-based standards represent the best approach for achieving this objective. Rules-based standards provide companies the opportunity to structure trzmsactions to meet the requirements for particular accounting treatments, even if such treatments don't reflect the true economic substance ofthe transaction. We recognize, however, that the current plethora of detailed rules has been demand-driven, suggesting that companies may request more guidance than that provided by concepts-based standards. Additionally, a change from rules-based to concepts-based standards magnifies the importance of informed professional judgment and expertise for implementation of standards. Overall, however, we believe that concepts-based standards, if applied properly, better support the FASB's stated mission of "improving the usefulness of financial reporting by focusing on the primary characteristics of relevance and reliability...."
RULES-BASED VS. CONCEPTS-BASED STANDARDS An Illustration of Rules-Based and Concepts-Based Standards
In order to make our discussion of concepts-based vs. rules-based standards more concrete, we characterize the accounting standard-setting process and its products as a continuum ranging from imequivocally rigid standards on one end to general definitions of economics-based concepts on the other end. An example of the extreme left (rigid) end of tbe continuimi is:
Annual depreciation expense for all fixed assets is to be 10 percent ofthe original cost of the asset until the asset is fully depreciated.
Sucb a rule leaves no room for judgment or disagreement about tbe eunount of depreciation expense to be recognized. Comparability and consistency across firms and through time is virtually assured under sudi a rule. However, sucb a standard lacks relevance due its inability to reflect the underlying economics of tbe reporting entity, wbicb differ across firms and tbrough time.
At tbe opposite (right) end of tbe continuimi is a provision or rule sucb as tbe following:
Depreciation expense for the reporting period should reflect the decline in the economic value ofthe asset over the period.* Sucb a standard requires tbe application of judgment and expertise by both managers and auditors. Tbe gosil is to record economic depreciation of tbe asset, something about which the manager arguably has more information than anyone else. Many might agree that such a rule reflects the underljang purpose of financial reporting, but argue that it is too costly to implement and would likely lead to results tbat are neitber comparable across firms nor consistent tbrough time.
Benefits and Costs of Rules-Based vs. Concepts-Based Standards

Rules-Based Standards
Evidence abounds tbat detailed standards csmnot meet tbe challenges of a complex and rapidly cbanging financial world, and that tbey frequently provide a benchmark for determining compliance in form but not in substance (Finnerty 1988) . The Committee * By using this example, the Committee is not taking a position about the appropriateness of using "decline in economic value" as a basis for depreciation; this is simply one concepts-based approach to depreciation that we use as an illustration.
believes it is impracticable, if not impossible, for any standard-setting organization to anticipate and provide for every possible form and type of financial transaction and business relationsbip. Detedled standards are likely to be incomplete or even obsolete by tbe time tbey are published. In addition, sucb detailed stemdards provide self-interested mamagers the opportunity to manipulate tbe reported results under tbe guise of complying witb the rules. In turn, auditors find it more difficult to thwart sucb manipulations of reported financial results wben detailed rules serve as tbe managers'justification. The Committee offers two examples of tbese problems associated witb rules-based standards. Tbe first example is accounting for leases. SFAS No. 13 is a rules-based standard with a list of four precise criteria, several of which contain numerical cut-off points, and the requirement tbat if any one of tbe criteria is met, a company must account for tbe lease as a capital lease. However, tbe application of tbese criteria bas been controversial since tbe promulgation of tbe standard, witb tbe subsequent issuance of hundreds of pages of documentation dealing witb leases; for exsimple, see tbe FASB's 450-page Accounting for Leases-A Codification as of October 1,1998 . Additionally, professional expertise, creative arrangements sucb as syntbetic leases, and judgment bave been applied to circumvent tbe accounting rules ratber tban to present financial statements tbat reflect tbe tmderlying economics of tbe tramsaction. For exEimple, Pulliam (1988) reports tbat tbird-party gu£irantors of tbe residual values of leased assets developed contracts to avoid tbe "90 percent present value of minimum lease pajmients" tbresbold imposed by SFAS No. 13. Imboff and Tbomas (1988) find tbat tbe most common effect of SFAS No. 13 was tbe substitution of operating leases for capital leases, presumably in order to avoid liability recognition.
Tbe second example is pooling vs. purchase accounting for business combinations. APB No. 16 cont£uned a list of 12 conditions necessary to qualify for pooling, an apparently brigbt line standard. However, even witb tbese precise conditions, Micbael Sutton, former Cbief Accoimtant of tbe SEC, estimated tbat bis staff spent 40 percent of tbeir time fielding questions on wbetber specific transaction structures could qualify for pooling treatment (McGoIdrick 1997) . Lys and Vincent (1995) document an extreme case in wbicb AT&T paid as mucb as $500 million in order to gain SEC approval of tbe poolingof-interests method of accounting for its acquisition of NCR.Î n bigbligbting tbese problems, tbe Committee turns to tbe Intemal Revenue Service (IRS) for analogy as to the effects of brigbt line rules. Tbe IRS relies on tbe Internal Revenue Code (IRC), Treasury Regulations, rulings, and case law to establisb wbetber taxpayers bave violated tbe rules-a negative standard of conduct. Tbere is genersd consensus among IRS constituents tbat tax rules bave become fearsomely complex, detailed, cumbersome, and costly, as tbey attempt to restrict trsmsaction structuring tbat accompanies sucb bright line rules. Tbus, detailed tax regulations can facilitate a "form over substance" treatment of an item.* We believe tbe tax code and regulations provide a negative example for tbe FASB, and tbat accounting standard setters sbouid provide guidelines for wbicb there is a positive standard of conduct, relying on substance over form and reflecting underlying economics ratber tban compliance witb sm arbitrary stemdeird.
The FASB recently eliminated the pooling-of-interests method of accoimting for business combinations, substituting a required treatment (purchase accounting) and also providing for significant judgment in the application ofthe new standards for the treatment of acquisition goodwill. We note, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has long held the doctrine that "in determining ttuc liability, taxing authorities must look through form to fact and substance" (Tex-Penn Oil Co., 37-1 USTC I 9194, 300 U.S. 481, 492-3).
Concepts-Based Standards
Tbe committee recognizes tbat tbe latitude inherent in concepts-based standards is a double-edged sword. Such latitude allows managers to choose accoimting treatments that reflect their informed understanding ofthe underljang economics of transactions. This latitude, however, also permits managers to advocate reporting treatments tbat do not reflect tbe underlying economics of a transaction. Managers, audit committee members, £ind auditors must possess both expert judgment and a desire for tinbiased reporting in order for conceptual standeirds to result in financial reporting that reflects underlying economics. Both the SEC and the Auditing Standards Board support this view with their focus on the quality, as opposed to simply the acceptability, of financieil reporting, as well as tbeir empbasis on tbe need for expert judgment and imbiased reporting (AICPA 1999; SEC 1999) .
Concepts-based standards have the potential to promote tbe financial reporting goals of tbe FASB in ways tbat rules-based standards cannot. First, as educators, we believe tbat individuals must possess a conceptual framework for financial information in order to use this information appropriately in decision making. Concepts-based standards reflect a more consistent application of tbe FASB's Conceptual Framework and enbsmce individuals' understanding of tbe framework. Tbus, a concepts-based approacb is consistent witb tbe FASB's stated goal to "improve tbe common understanding of tbe nature and purposes of information contained in financial reports."
Second, we believe concepts-based standards are consistent witb tbe stated goal of tbe FASB to promote convergence of accounting standards worldwide. Tbe European Commission is reportedly (Guerrera Eind Normztn 2002) proposing tbat tbe U.S. abandon GAAP in favor of tbe "more flexible IAS, wbicb empbasizes 'substance over form' in auditors' inspection of tbe accounts." A concepts-based approacb likely will lead to greater agreement in standard setting between tbe FASB and IASB eind tbus promote international barmonization.
REVIEW OF RELATED ACADEMIC RESEARCH
Tbe academic accounting literature is somewhat limited with respect to direct research on tbe issue of concepts-based vs. rules-based standards for fineincial reporting. However, several studies sbed light on issues related to tbe benefits and costs of tbese two approaches; we summarize a representative sample of tbese below. Some of tbis researcb relates to audits of fuiEincial statements ratber tban to tbe setting of standards. Tbe Committee believes that the tension and potential conflict between auditors and tbeir clients are inherently sepeirable from, but not always distinctly different from, tbe tension and potentied conflict between preparers £md users of financi£il statements. Altbougb auditing tensions sbouid not dictate tbe form and content of accounting standards, we believe tbat inferences about standard setting can be drawn from tbe literature on auditing.
Preparers' Reaction to Concepts-Based and Rules-Based Standards
Tbe primeiry responsibility for financial reports lies witb management. Academic literature provides abundemt evidence tbat managers, witb or witbout tbe knowledge and/or consent of tbeir auditors, both interpret rules and structure transactions to acbieve desired accounting treatments. Tbere is an extensive empirical/arcbival accounting literature (e.g.. Watts and Zimmerman 1986) addressing tbe incentives of managers to make financial reporting choices and decisions in tbeir own best interests. Tbese studies do not provide a comparison of concepts-based and rules-based standards but ratber document evidence of manipulation of financial reporting for botb ts^pes of standards.
A recent study specifically addresses the effects of bright line vs. conceptueil stand£irds using survey data gathered from 253 audit partners on their experience with 515 attempts at eamings msinagement by their clients (Nelson et al. 2002) . This study reports that managers are more likely to attempt eamings management with transaction structuring when precise standards govern the accounting-leases, equity vs. cost method, consolidations, and so forth-than when standards are more flexible. Correspondingly, auditors are more likely to permit eamings management attempts through transaction structuring to stand when governing rules are precise and the transaction structuring is consistent with the rules. Nelson et al. (2002) find that when the standard provides no "bright line" for managers to use in transaction structuring, they are less likely to engage in costly transaction structuring. However, with such concepts-based standards, managers are more likely to justify eju-nings management attempts by convincing the auditor of their interpretation of the imprecise rules. Auditors axe more likely to permit such eamings management attempts to stand when the accounting is governed by more flexible or subjective standards.
In related research, Cuccia et al. (1995) use experimentsd methods to examine reporting aggressiveness in the tzix area. They study whether professioneil tax practitioners are more or less aggressive with vague, verbal standards than they are under more precise, quantitative or numeric£il standards. The authors find that tax practitioners are equally aggressive under both types of steuidards but that the form of their aggression varies. That is, with vaguely worded standards, the practitioners use the latitude inherent in the regulation to justify aggressive reporting. With numerical standards, they instead use the latitude available in assessing evidentiary support to justify an aggressive reporting position. The authors conclude that when practitioners have incentives to report aggressively, modifications to standards to make them more stringent and quEintitative may prove ineffective in reducing the aggressiveness of the reporting. Although there are significant differences between tax preparers and auditors and their respective relations with their clients, these results likely have implications for the effects of financial accoimting standards.
Costs Incurred to Structure Transactions
Dye (2002) examines transaction structuring by modeling analytically the manager's financial reporting process as one of classification meinipulation. That is, for many standeu-ds, there is a generally preferred outcome, such as operating rather than capital lease treatment, and classification manipulation results in more firms attaining the preferred accounting treatment than would otherwise be the case \mder GAAP. He concludes that such manipulation reduces the effectiveness of rules in a standard to distinguish among true economic differences in transactions. Rather, classification m£inipulation leads to a shadow standard that simply demarks the boundary between those firms that are or are not willing to pay the cost needed to structure a transaction to secure the more favorable classification. In other words. Dye (2002) provides support for Nelson et al.'s (2002) conclusion that rigid standards will increase mauiagers' ability to msmipulate financial reporting outcomes opportunistically, and thus weaken the effectiveness ofthe standard.
EmpiricEil research provides evidence that managers structure transactions to avoid balance sheet recognition. Examples include Bowman (1980) and Ely (1995) on leases and Shevlin (1987) on R&D limited partnerships. Engel et al. (1999) explore whether managers will incur costs in order to simply chsinge balance sheet classification of a financial transaction as equity rather than debt. They find that firms incurred costs of as much as $43 million in order to classify a transaction as equity rather than debt.
Auditors and Concepts-Based vs. Rules-Based Standards
One ofthe auditor's roles is to monitor management's impulses to act opportunistically in financial reporting. Several academic studies offer indirect support for nilesbased standards by documenting that rigid GAAP provides auditors with the justification needed to perform this monitoring function. For example, in an experiment using 54 audit partners as participants, Trompeter (1994) finds evidence that auditors are less able to resist client pressure for aggressive reporting when there is a wider range of acceptable accounting alternatives. Knapp (1987) reports that audit committees are more likely to support £in auditor in a dispute with management when the issue is covered by technical standards. Magee and Tseng (1990) model the links between audit pricing, auditor independence, and the characteristics of accounting standards. They find that when accoimting standards are specific, threats by the client to "opinion shop" in the case of a dispute are less effective because it is likely that all auditors will take the same position on an issue. This is supported by the idea that fiexible standards accompany greater confiict and more negotiation efforts between auditor and client (Gibbins et al. 2001) .
Studies find that other factors also affect auditor-client negotiations over GAAP. For example, Trompeter (1994) finds that the compensation structure ofthe auditing firm affects the auditor's ability to resist client pressures. Nelson et al. (2002) report that the size ofthe client euid the size ofthe eamings management influence the auditor's decision whether to waive enforcement when eamings management is apparent. Based on an experiment using experienced auditors, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) conclude that the auditor's incentives determined by the level of audit risk infiuence significantly the interpretation ofthe applicable accounting standard. They find that when engagement risk is moderate, auditors prefer the aggressive reporting method and aggressively apply the relevant financial accoimting standard. When engagement risk is high, the auditors prefer the conservative reporting method and conservatively apply the relevant professional standard.
Effectiveness of Concepts-Based Standards
Hronsky and Houghton (2001) provide some evidence on the effectiveness of conceptsbased standards. Specifically, they examine whether changes in the wording of a conceptual standard results in different accounting treatments. They test classification of items as extraordinary using the change in the definition in Australia's standard on extraordinary items and 40 experienced auditors as experimental participants. Regulators changed the definition in order to remove the fiexibility inherent in the old definition Eind thus "limit the inconsistencies and zdleged opportunism observed in practice." The authors find significant differences in classification of items based on the new rules, fi'om which they infer the importance of definitions and interpretations in decision making. The authors conclude that at least one important party in the financial reporting process (auditors) perceived the change in the regulated definition as having a different meaning fi-om the old definition. Additionally, results suggest that there was a systematic relation between the perceived meaning and the subsequent classification decision outcome, in the direction intended by the regulators. This study provides evidence that precision in the wording of conceptual standards may in fact mitigate "aggressive" reporting.
Conclusions
Overall, resvilts ofthe academic literature indicate that the two different approaches to accoxinting standards alter neither the incentives nor the ability of management to report opportunistically; only the nature and characteristics of opportunistic reporting vary depending on the nature of the standard. This research provides some evidence that the rigid ("bright line") or flexible nature ofthe governing accoimting standard is important, but genei-Jilly less important thsin incentives faced by both managers and auditors. Finally, the literature provides some evidence that precision in the wording of concepts-based standards has some effect on financial reporting decisions.
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCEPTS-BASED STANDARDS
FASB members and staff asked the Committee to undertake the task of recasting two standards, SFAS No. 87 and SFAS No. 133, as concepts-based standards. We present our recasting of SFAS No. 87 in the Appendix; see the AAA web site (http://www.aaaedu.org) for the recasting of SFAS No. 133. In completing this task, the Committee both enumerated desirable characteristics of concepts-based standards and provided insight on implementation issues. We discuss these two issues in tvim.
Characteristics of Concepts-Based Standards
The Committee first determined characteristics that a concepts-based steindard should possess. Our list of characteristics is as follows. 1) In a concepts-based standard, the economic substance, not the form, of a given transaction should guide its financial reporting. The FASB's Conceptual Framework defines the classification and measurement of economic transactions and, accordingly, should serve as the foundation for financial reporting that refiects the economie substance of a transaction. 2) A concepts-based standard should include a description of the particular transaction that is the subject ofthe standard. This description should include the underlying economics ofthe trsmsaction in order to provide a common, explicit understanding of these economics.' 3) A concepts-based standard should include a general discussion ofthe mapping between the economics of a treinsaction smd the financial statements, using the Conceptuzil Framework to guide classification and measurement issues associated with this mapping. 4) A concepts-based standard may include implementation guidance, most likely in the form of examples that illustrate application ofthe standard's general principles to typical transactions covered by the standard. In these implementation examples, it may be necessary to make choices that are based on practicality rather than explicitly on the concepts. We believe this is acceptable, but should be noted as such in the discussion ofthe example. 5) In a concepts-based standard, the Board should be careful when creating "names" for concepts, even if they enhance the readability ofthe standard. The names may already have connotations for readers that differ from the concept that the Board heis in mind.
If it is unavoidable to use such neunes, the Board should articulate their definitions. Storey and Storey (1998, 86) highlight the importance of having "common premises" when developing conceptual statements in their FASB monograph. The Framework of Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards. As they state, "If experience is the freune of reference, no one can be sure ofthe starting point, if one exists at all, because everyone's experience is different." 6) Concepts-based standards should Include disclosure requirements related to a description ofthe economics ofthe transaction being reported, the assumptions made in the reporting, and any supporting information that will facilitate understanding both the economics and the reporting.
Issues Associated with a Conceptual Approach to Standard Setting
The Committee found the task of recasting current standards as concepts-based standards to be both engaging and challenging. In this section, we simimarize issues that arose during our process of revising the standards.
As noted previously, approaches to standards setting can be depicted as a continuimi, with purely rules-based standards on one end and purely concepts-based standards on the other. One primary issue the Committee encountered wsis where on this continuum to place the revised standards. That is, to what extent should concepts-based standards represent "ideal" standards that reflect the imderlying economics ofthe transaction in a "pure" fashion? Given the academic orientation of most ofthe Committee's members, our natural inclination is to advocate that conceptual standards reflect the economics as purely as possible.
We encountered several issues when taking an economics-based approach for rewriting the two standards. First, we encountered the issue that the reporting for one transaction depends on the reporting for other transactions, such as assets and liabilities. In rewriting standards, problems arise due to the fact that not all of a firm's economic assets and liabilities etre recorded. For assets and liabilities that are recorded, not all are recorded at fair value. Such recognition and measurement issues for assets and liabilities lead to problems with writing economic-based conceptual standards. For example, if all of a firm's assets eind liabilities were recorded at fair values, there would be no need to distinguish between derivatives that were used to hedge vs. not used to hedge, between fair value and cash flow hedges, between separate and embedded derivatives, or even between derivatives that are used for hedging and other "instruments" that can act as hedges. One should simply record all derivatives at fair value with changes in fsiir value recorded in income. Our point here is not necessarily an endorsement of fair value accounting, rather, it is simply to point out the issues associated with refiecting "true economics" in rewriting standards as conceptual standards.
A second issue is that many rules in the current stsmdards appeeir to eirise from the practicality of dealing with constituents' concems, rather than arising from the underlying economics ofthe transaction. The transition rules and corridor approach to recognizing unreahzed gains and losses in SFAS No. 87 are examples of such rules. A question arises as to the extent to which conceptual standards should include such concessions to practicality. That is, to what extent should conceptual standards initially include practical considerations and gradually move to refiect the underlying economics vs. imposing an immediate change to an economics-based standard? We do not have an answer to this question, but raise it as an issue that needs to be considered. The Committee's approach to revising SFAS No. 87 more closely refiected the immediate transition to economics-based standards, without regeu'd to practical concems of constituents.
A third observation relates to the effect of a conceptueil approach on the need for standards related to specific transactions. It is possible that some individual standards will be straightforward applications ofthe concepts in the FASB's Conceptual Framework. For example, accoimting for pensions may require only a relatively straightforward application ofthe definition of liabilities and expenses. In effect, one view is that the accounting for pensions already exists in the Conceptual Framework and thus a concepts-based standard on pensions will add little. Here a concepts-based pension standard need only define pensions in terms of elements ofthe Conceptual Framework and provide illustrations of appljdng the framework. On a related point, a move to conceptsbased standards allows for some combination of current standards. For example, SFAS No. 87 on pensions and SFAS No. 106 on other post-retirement benefits potentially could be combined into a single conceptual standard.
Finally, all of these observations raise the issue of whether the FASB should take a piecemeal or a one-shot, comprehensive approach to rewriting standards as conceptsbased rather than rules-based. In a piecemeal approach, the FASB writes all new standards as concepts-based standards. All past rules are rewritten one by one. Such an approach may be necesssury due to practical considerations. However, the Committee raises two issues related to this approach. First, the order in which the recasting of old standards is done is important in order to avoid having to go back and re-recast a standard due to issues that arise in recasting another standard. Second, it may be necesseiry to undertake a comprehensive re-thinking ofthe Conceptual Framework before undertaking revision of individual standards. For example, in the extreme, if a conceptsbased approach is intended to refiect purely the economics of transactions, the idea of what constitutes assets, liabilities, and equity of the firm and the measurement basis for these elements needs to be reconsidered.
The Committee realizes that the FASB constantly reconsiders such issues. However, we believe a more comprehensive re-thinking ofthe Conceptual Framework may be needed prior to undertaking revision of current stsmdards. One approach to accomplishing this goal would be to have a separate project on conceptueil standard setting that is distinct from the process of setting current standards.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In closing, the Committee believes consideration of a concepts-based approach to standau-d setting should be given priority. As indicated, the Committee's experience suggests that this process will not be easy and that many issues will need to be resolved, but we believe undertaking such a project will improve standeird setting. We recognize, consistent with evidence in accounting research, that the implementation and enforcement of concepts-based accounting stemdards may be daunting because they necessarily rely on the joint efforts of management, the board of directors, and the auditors to apply professional expertise and judgment to achieve unbiased financial reporting. However, the tensions between and among the companies, their auditors, investors, and regulators are not specific to the nature of the standards as conceptsbased or rules-based. Standards, iii whatever form, cannot solve these conflicts. We believe that issues of incentives and monitoring should be addressed separately and should not determine the nature of accounting standards.
With concepts-based standards, the importance of professional judgment and the desire for unbiased reporting is paramount. However, as noted by Mason and Gibbins (1991) , professional judgment is important in all cases. In discussing the issue of professional judgment, they quote from the Introduction to Accounting Recommendations to the CICA Handbook: "no rule of general application can be phrased to suit all circumstances...that may arise, nor is there any substitute for the exercise of professional judgment in the determination of what constitutes fair presentation or good practice in a particular case." The Committee encourages the FASB to provide explicit references to the importance of professional judgment in interpreting eind implementing concepts-based standards in the preparation of financial reports.
APPENDIX A Conceptual Approach for SFAS No. 87, Employers' Accounting for Pensions
Overview and Background Comments
There are two main economic aspects to the accounting for pensions. The first is to recognize the current period pension expense and the second is to recognize the total unfunded obligation for pension benefits as ofthe end ofthe reporting period.
In reformulating SFAS No. 87 from a rules-based to conceptual standard, we focused on capturing economic substance over form and maintaining consistency with the FASB's Conceptual Framework. We believe that the principles underlying SFAS No. 87, as written, generally are consistent with the Conceptual Framework.
However, the detailed rules provided in SFAS No. 87 (e.g., corridor amortization and recognizing a minimum liability amount) are not appropriate to a conceptual standard. Many of these riiles appear to be compromises aimed at maintaining certain desired characteristics ofthe financial statements unrelated to the economic substance of the transactions. The impetus for other detailed rules appears to be the Board's concern regarding transition accounting at the time ofthe issuance ofthe stemdard. We do not consider transition accounting to be a pertinent concem in a concepts-based standard £uid so we eliminate the rules related to transition accounting. We expect that any cumulative effect of an accounting change will be reported as such in the year of transition.
We shortened SFAS No. 87 substantially and rewrote it with minimal detailed implementation guidance because we believe that there is a reasonably common and accepted definition of pensions benefits, unlike otber transactions such as derivatives. Additionally, the goals ofthe FASB with respect to pension reporting are quite straightforward and consistent with the Conceptueil Framework. We do, however, retain most of the disclosure requirements of SFAS No. 87. We consider these disclosures to be of primary importance to investors in understanding the accounting for pensions. We conclude that a shortened and simplified standard accomplishes the financi£d reporting goals for pensions.
We believe that under a conceptual approach to stemdard setting, the standfu'd should encompass all post-employment benefits and not just those related to pensions. We do not perceive an economic or philosophical difference between pension benefits and, for example, health care benefits. However, because ofthe purpose of this exercise, we felt tbat the focus should remain on SFAS No. 87 £is written, so we did not include other post-employment benefits in the reconstituted standard.
We also note that certain inconsistencies arise in converting an existing standfird such as SFAS No. 87 into a conceptual standard due to the connections between the subject standard and other existing standards. For example, SFAS No. 87 refers to SFAS No. 34 on Capitalization of Interest Costs, among others. We do not address such specific relations, recognizing that if all standards are rewritten as conceptual, such inconsistencies should disappear.
We rely on the Conceptual Framework for the definition of both an asset and a liability in determining whether the pension plan assets and the unfunded pension obligation should be carried on the statement of financial position. The chainge in the net pension asset or liability should be reported in income.
Tbe first section ofthe existing standard, tbe Simimary, states tbat SFAS No. 87 retains three fundamental aspects of past pension accounting: delaying recognition of certain events, reporting net cost, and offsetting liabilities and assets. We retain only the third of these reporting approaches. We eliminate the delayed recognition of prior service cost and gains and losses on pension assets-^the Committee believes that the underlying economics requires that recognition should be contemporaneous. Second, because one of the medn objectives of the standard is to report the current period's pension cost, the Committee believes that the compensation (service) component ofthe cost should be separately reported Jind not offset against the financial components of the pension cost-therefore we eliminated the reporting of "net cost." We believe that the components ofthe cost that relate to financing issues-specifically interest expense on the pension liability and gains and losses on the pension asset-should be reported separately from the compensation component. We agree with SFAS No. 87 that offsetting pension assets and liabilities is appropriate-the assets contributed by the employer to the pension plan discharge a portion ofthe obligation and so we retained the offsetting provision for assets and liabilities.
We note that there are many techniques used by actuaries to determine the total amount ofthe employer's pension obligation. We do not believe that it is appropriate for a conceptual standard to specify the form of the computation or the techniques and assimiptions to be applied. The standard requires disclosure ofthe techniques and assumptions used by tbe actuary to determine the gross pension obligation and the components of periodic pension expense (income).
The The outline ofthe reconstituted standard is provided below in tabular format with the conceptual standard's antecedent from tbe original SFAS No. 87 pronouncement shown in the first column.
Because the revised standard is quite short, the entire standard is presented below in standard typeface (with the exception ofthe glossary terms). Editorial comments by the Committee are shown in italics. 
Suggested TextJComments
A. Objective of Statement
The objective of this statement is to provide standards for the recognition and disclosure ofthe employer's compensation cost for pension benefits for the reporting period and of the employer's related liability for employees' pension benefits as ofthe end ofthe reporting period.
Pension benefits constitute one element of employee compensation and, as with other forms of compensation, the cost of that compensation is to be accrued eind recognized as an expense in the period incurred.
For pension costs that have been accrued but not funded, a corresponding liability for the unfunded obligation is to be recognized on the balance sheet. An employer with an overfunded pension obligation has an asset for the amount overfunded. Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the terms of the plan that define the benefits an employee will receive (the plan's benefit formula) provide the most relevant and reliable indication of how pension costs and obligations are incurred.
The Board recognizes that computation of the current period's pension expense and ofthe end of period pension obligation requires the use of estimates as well as the prediction of events over which the employer has little or no control. Actuarial assumptions include discount rates and probability of payment. The necessity of making and incorporating such estimates and predictions does not diminish the importance of recognizing the cost and obligation in order to reflect on the financial statements of the firm, the economic implications euid consequences for the employer of providing pension benefits for employees.
History of pension accounting, not appropriate for inclusion in body of standard, perhaps relegate to an appendix-or eliminate.
B. Scope and Definitions
Pension plans in the U.S. are governed by many laws and regulations. Generally these require that pension plans be funded by the employer and that the assets funding the pensions be transferred to the pension trustee. Pension plans take many forms. Frequently, pension benefits provide for periodic payment to retired employees or to their survivors, but they may also include lump sum payments or other t3^es of benefits. AU such plans are included within the scope of this standard. Statutory funding requirements should have no effect on the recognition of the cost and liability associated with pensions.
(16, 21, 24)
(15-53)
Likewise, an employer's obligation to provide pension benefits may take a variety of forms and may be financed in different ways. This Statement applies to any arrangement that is similar in economic substeuice to a pension plan regardless ofthe particular terms of the plan or the form of financing. This Statement applies to a written plan as well as to a plan whose existence may be implied from a well-established but perhaps unwritten practice of paying postretirement benefits.
Pension benefits. Pension benefits are part ofthe compensation paid to an employee for services. Generally, but not always, the amount of benefit to be peiid depends on a number of future events (including, for example, the employee's years of service, the employee's compensation, how long the employee and any survivor lives) that are incorporated into the computation of the benefit. The total amount of the promised benefit can only be estimated.
Pension (service) cost. This is the current period cost of the employer of providing pension benefits to employees for the services rendered during the period. The actuarial present value of these benefits is generally determined by the terms ofthe plan. This cost may include several additional components, including but not limited to: the impact of pleui amendments, including retroactive enhancements; and changes in actuarial assumptions related to employees (e.g., age at retirement, years of retirement).
Pension (financing) cost. The current period financing cost of the pension plans includes the interest cost on the gross liability net ofthe chemge in the fair market veilue ofthe plan assets, adjusted for contributions and disbursements.
Net Pension obligation (asset).
The accumulated liability ofthe employer for the employees' pension benefits less the fair value of plan assets. 
C. Disclosure Requirements This standard requires the employer to provide disclosures necessary for understanding the source and amounts ofthe reported pension cost and pension obligation. The underlying assumptions used in the computations are integral to such an understanding. These disclosures must include but are not limited to: a. A description of the plan including employee groups covered, type of benefit formula, fimding policy, and the nature and effect of significant matters affecting comparability of information for all periods presented. b. Actuarial present value of benefits attributed by the plan's benefit formula to services rendered by employees during the reporting period including the key assumptions behind the computation (the service cost component). c. Assumptions and computations supporting the financing cost component of pension cost. d. Actuarial present value of all benefits attributed by the plan's benefit formiila to employee service rendered prior to the current reporting period. e. Actuarial present value of all vested pension benefits as of the reporting date. f. Description ofthe plan assets as ofthe reporting date including the tjrpes of assets held and their fair market value. g. Schedule reconciling the change in the fair market value of plan assets from the previous reporting date, including, but not limited to the following: i) actual return on plan assets ii) employer's contribution during the period iii) benefits paid to employees during the period iv) realized gains and losses on plan assets during the period v) unrealized gains and losses on plan assets during the period h. Amount of pension cost deductible for federal income tax purposes. i. Key actuarial assumptions. j. Effect of changes in actuarial assumptions on the current period pension cost and the end of the period pension liability. k. Expected impact of statutory funding requirements on liquidity and financial position. 
GLOSSARY
This appendix contains definitions of certain terms used in accounting for pensions.
Actual retum on plan assets. The difference between the fair value of plan assets at the end of the period and the fair value at the beginning of the period, adjusted for contributions and payments of benefits during the period. Actuarial funding method. Any of several techniques that actuaries use in determining the amounts and incidence of employer contributions to provide for pension benefits. Actuarial present value. The value, as of a specified date, of an amount or series of amounts payable or receivable thereafter, with each amount adjusted to reflect (a) the time value of money (through discounts for interest) and (b) the probability of payment (by means of decrements for events such as death, disabihty, withdrawal, or retirement) between the specified date and the expected date of payment. Actuarial assumptions. Estimates ofthe occurrence of future events affecting pension costs, such as mortality, withdrawal, disablement and retirement, changes in compensation and national pension benefits, and discount rates to reflect the time value of money. Benefits. Payments to which participants may be entitled under a pension plan, including pension benefits, death benefits, and benefits due on termination of employment. Interest cost. The accrual of interest on the total pension hability over the reporting period. Pension benefit formula. The basis for determining payments to which participants may be entitled under a pension plan. Pension benefit formulas usually refer to the employee's service or compensation or both.
Plan assets. Assets-usually stocks, bonds, and other investments-^that have been segregated and restricted (usually in a trust) to provide benefits. Plan assets include amounts contributed by the employer (and by employees for a contributory plan) and eimounts eamed from investing the contributions, less benefits paid. Service. Employment taken into consideration under a pension plan. Years of employment before the inception of a plan constitute an employee's past service; years thereafter are classified in relation to the particular actuarial valuation being made or discussed. Years of employment (including past service) prior to the date of a particular valuation constitute prior service; years of employment following the date ofthe valuation constitute future service; a yetir of employment adjacent to the date of valuation, or in which such date falls, constitutes current service. Service cost. The actuarial present value of benefits attributed by the pension benefit formula to services rendered by employees during that period. Vested benefit obligation. The actuarial present value of vested benefits. Vested benefits. Benefits for which the employee's right to receive a present or future pension benefit is no longer contingent on remaining in the service of the employer. (Other conditions, such as inadequacy of the pension fund, may prevent the employee from receiving the vested benefit.)
